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Abstract 
We show that the character and the morality of citizens are important ingredients of economic 
growth because they go hand in hand with the great institutions of private property, democ-
racy, and free markets. Our approach enables us to establish this result by reference to the 
structure and performance of the ancient economies of Athens and Sparta during the period 
490-338 BC. Athens grew vastly wealthier than Sparta essentially because its institutions 
were optimally adjusted to confront the basic scarcity of grains, whereas the institutions of 
Sparta were optimally adjusted to sustain its military supremacy. However, in both cases there 
emerged systems of morality, which secured the operating efficiency of their institutions. 
Therefore, poor countries in search of potent strategies for rapid economic growth should not 
just try to emulate the institutions of economically advanced countries. At the same time, they 
should put the emphasis of their efforts to setting up agoge systems, so as to infuse into the 
character of their citizens compatible “ethos”. For, without the latter, no matter how success-
fully they adapt the institutions of democracy and free markets, rapid economic growth will be 
inhibited from the lack of an environment of generalized morality. In this regard, the ideal type 
model of agoge is the one that prevailed in ancient Athens 25 centuries ago. 
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(From a dialogue between Pope Benedict XIV and Voltaire somewhere in the 
grateful memory of mankind) 
………………………………………………………………... 
Voltaire: I still think that philosophers can dispense with morality. 
Pope Benedict XIV: How naïve you are. Are children capable of philosophy? Can 
children reason? Society is based upon morality, morality is based upon 
character, character is formed in childhood and youth long before reason 
can be a guide. We must infuse morality into the individual when he is 
young and malleable; then it may be strong enough to withstand his indi-
vidualistic impulses, even his individualistic reasoning. I am afraid you 
began to think too soon. The intellect is constitutional individualist, and 
when it is uncontrolled by morality it can tear society to pieces. 
……………………………………………………………………………...  
                     
Durant and Durant, (1967), The Story of Civilization, The Age of Voltaire, vol. 9, 
791. 
 
1. Introduction 
Thinking and policy advice about questions relating to economic development have 
changed dramatically over the last 50 years. In the two decades following World War II 
economists thought, and policy advisors from international organizations suggested to poor 
countries, that the quickest road to development was to save and invest, in order to accumulate 
modern and hence more productive capital, to educate their labor force, so as to meet the demand 
for various skills that accompanies industrialization, to give emphasis to exportable goods, so as 
to alleviate the deficits in the balance of payments, etc. But the results were not encouraging. The 
industries they established became dormant and inefficient behind the tall walls of protection from 
international competition. The educational systems they set up to train their citizens, led to mis-
alignments with demanded skills, whereas many of their better minds emigrated to advance coun-
tries in search of better opportunities; and in general, as certain authors have noted,1 the biggest 
beneficiaries of these development strategies may have been the high-priced consultants who 
recommended them.     
Thus, in view of the persistence of poverty in many parts of the world and the inability 
of prevailing growth theory to provide effective policy guidance, economists turned to the hy-
pothesis that the culprit to blame was geography. Admittedly since it determines the climate, 
the resource endowments, the incidence of diseases and the ecology, geography should influ-
ence the technology of a country as well as the incentives of its citizens. But given that policy 
                                                 
1  For a critique of the failure of neoclassical growth theory and policy to help many countries to escape from their poverty 
trap, see, for example, Krueger (1993). 
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makers cannot exercise meaningful control over these variables, the geography hypothesis 
presented a gloomy outlook for many countries located in disadvantaged regions, and pro-
voked researchers into looking for more efficient development strategies in other directions. 
This search led to the realization that poor countries lack better markets, more educated peo-
ple, and more modern capital, because they do not have well defined systems of property 
rights, the rule of law is lax, the freedom of exchange is restricted, etc. Thus, by attributing 
the differences in living standards between rich and poor nations to these fundamental causes, 
researchers proposed the so-called institutions hypothesis.2 
Tests of this hypothesis have shown that institutions do matter for economic growth. 
But in as much as the results from these tests provide considerable and encouraging evidence, 
the establishment of effective institutions is not an easy undertaking. This is so because the 
choices of desirable forms of institutions and the degree of their effectiveness have been 
found more recently to depend on various context specific factors, that arise from differences 
not only in geography but also in historical developments, political economy circumstances 
and other initial conditions. Still, from the research by Platteau (1994), Yaffey (1998), Fehr 
and Schmidt (1999) and others, it turns out that there are certain fundamental context invari-
ant processes that contribute positively, either by improving the quality of life per se, or by 
facilitating the establishment and the functioning of wealth enhancing institutions. One of 
them being morality that Pope Benedict XIV stressed in the captioned passage from his 
imaginary discussion with Voltaire. So for us it is fascinating to add to this literature by look-
ing at the difference that morality made to the distinctly disparate levels of wealth that the 
classical Athens and Sparta reached at the peak of their power.  
With this agenda in mind, our plan is to characterize the nature of the relationship be-
tween morality and growth promoting institutions by drawing on the case of ancient Greece. 
By doing so, it is our hope that a clear picture of the fundamental differences between Athens 
and Sparta will emerge, which will explain in a convincing manner why only Athens became 
the main economic power in classical antiquity. This endeavor is undertaken in the next three 
sections. In particular, in Section 2 we present a brief account of what we know with relative 
certainty about the stylized features pertaining to the economies of the two city-states during 
the 150 year period from the victory of Greeks in Marathon against the Persians in 490 to 430 
BC., i.e. the year that Sparta attacked Athens thus starting the Peloponnesian War, and from 
then to 338 during which the economic growth in the two city-states decelerated (Isager and 
                                                 
2  Hodgson (1988) gives an early list of authors and writings that contributed to the foundation of the school of Institutional 
Economics.   
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Hansen, 1975, 52-5). In Section 3 we attempt to answer the following questions: a) the econ-
omy of Athens was organized according to a proto-capitalistic market system, whereas that of 
Sparta had all the characteristics of a centrally administered economy. Did this fundamental dif-
ference influence their economic performance?  b) Aside from the differences in their economic 
organization, the two city-states differed also in the moral norms that prevailed among their citi-
zens. Which were their main differences? c) Significant differences were also observed in the 
processes for infusing moral norms to their citizens, as well as in the institutions for monitoring 
moral behavior and discouraging transgressions. To what extent might these differences in moral 
norms be attributed to the differences in the organization of the respective economies? Then, in 
Section 4 we turn to the lessons that we can derive from the above discussion, and, finally, Sec-
tion 5 contains a synopsis of our conclusions. 
 
2.  The stylized features of the two economies 
From Aristotle’s Politics and The Athenian Constitution in antiquity, to Fustel des 
Coulages (1866), Glotz (1928), Finley (1981) and numerous other writers, we have come to 
know how the city, i.e. the Greek Polis, evolved through association and symbiosis. The first 
unit was the household (oikos), which comprised all those who sat to eat in the same table and 
preyed to the same god. As the household multiplied, the descendants who lived in the same 
area and accepted the authority of the eldest male of the original family formed a village, i.e. 
the Greek Kome. Finally, by willful and at times coercive association, many villages that 
were located in a geographically homogeneous but naturally delimited area formed a city-
state. Initially, the families that made up the city-state maintained their primordial rights and 
obliged their members to work for the families’ interests. But as family ties loosened up and 
individuals got liberated, the powers of the city-state increased at the expense of the families 
that constituted it. Thus the city-state established its authority and started to pursue objectives 
that were construed to be in the interest of all citizens, irrespective of the families to which 
they belonged. This was the second stage in the development of city-states and it was fol-
lowed by a third one in which happened exactly what Pope Benedict XIV answered to Vol-
taire. That is, the excesses of individualism after the end of the Peloponnesian War tore apart 
the social fabric of city-states and thus made them easy targets to the forces of king Philip of 
Macedonia, who in 338 BC unified all Greek city-states into one large state under his reign. 
The size of city-states was small. Generally, they covered an area not exceeding the 
limits of a contemporary municipality. But Athens and Sparta stretched over exceptionally 
large areas. In particular, as mentioned by Glotz (1928, 34), when Sparta added to Laconia the 
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region of Messinea in the middle of the 7th century BC it became the first power in Greece, 
because it controlled a land of 8.400 square kilometers, whereas when Athens added to its terri-
tory the island of Salamis and the district of Oropos in the 6th century BC, it extended over an area 
of 2.650 square kilometers. Moreover, as documented by Fleck and Hansen (2006) the fertility of 
soil in Sparta was far superior to that of Athens, so it enjoyed a significant comparative advantage 
in agriculture because more grain could be produced there with less effort and investment.  
In order to understand the political and social environment in which the two econo-
mies were embedded, a few brief remarks are in order regarding the size and the structure of 
their population, as well as the nature of their governments and the objectives under which 
they were governed. Population estimates are extremely inaccurate. But a simple average of 
the estimates mentioned by Amemiya (2006, Part I, 58-9) points to a population for Athens in 
430 BC of about 300000, consisting of 180000 citizens, 50000 metics and 70000 private 
slaves, whereas from the estimates quoted by Andreades (1933, 65, ft.2) for Sparta its popula-
tion in the same period was about 250000, composed of 15000 citizens or Homoioi (Όμοιοι), 
80000 Perioikoi (Περίοικοι) and 155000 public slaves or Helots (Είλωτες).  
The systems of government of the two city-states differed significantly. After the age 
of revolution 750-650 BC, and under the leadership of some insightful politicians, Athens was 
organized politically on the basis of certain fundamental principles, which remain until now 
the basis of democracy. As Pericles proudly declared in his epitaph, these principles were the 
following: (a) the government of Athens was in the hands, not of the few, but of many (i.e. the 
majority principle); (b) in legal affairs all citizens were equal for the settlement of their pri-
vate disputes (the principle of equality before the law); (c) with respect to the importance of 
each citizen to the city-state, public honors were conferred not because a citizen belonged to a 
particular class, but because of personal merits (the principle of meritocracy), and (d) there 
prevailed freedom from suspicion of one another in the pursuit of every-day life (the principle 
of personal liberty) (Thucydides, II, 34). In more recent years these principles and democracy 
that was founded on them have proved positive in sustaining economic development (Feld 
and Savior, 1997) and preventing extreme inequality in the distribution of wealth (Gradstein 
and Milanovic, 2002). 
In Sparta the government was in the hands of few. At the top was the senate or Ger-
ousia, which consisted of two hereditary kings and 28 nobles over 60 years of age who were 
elected for life. This body had mostly consultative and judiciary powers. But it participated 
also in the determination of the subjects that were introduced in the popular assembly or 
Apella.  The Apella was made up of all citizens above 30 years of age and was presided over 
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by 5 Ephors, who were elected for one year. However, as the citizens in the Apella could only 
accept or reject by voice, without discussing the recommendations that were brought in front 
of them, the real rulers of Sparta were the Ephors. For this reason, Aristotle (Politics, 1270b, 
10-30) argued that the system by which Sparta was governed seemed to be an oligarchy. 
Thus, since they were not consulted in what they considered to be the crucial affairs of their 
city, the citizens in Sparta were not politically active.  
Finally, with respect to the objectives of their governments, Athens was governed to 
maximize the wealth and the eternal glory of the city in an environment of self-restrained in-
dividual liberty, whereas Sparta was governed as if its survival was constantly threatened by 
other cities and thus had to live under a permanent state of siege, where, of course, the liber-
ties of individuals and their well-being did not matter. With the above in mind, we turn now 
to the stylized features of the two economies. 
 
2.1 The economy of Athens  
The ideal type structure of the Athenian economy could be reasonably conceived to 
consist of four sectors. These were: a) the public sector, which included the military; b) the 
private sector, comprising the sub-sectors of production, distribution and money and banking; 
c) the import-export sector with its supporting capabilities of shipping, insurance and ware-
housing; and d) the system of agoge (αγωγή) for the upbringing of young Athenians and 
maintaining their ethos through life. As we will explain shortly, the Athenian system of agoge 
differed fundamentally from that of Sparta because it operated differently and had totally dif-
ferent tenets. But for now we shall focus briefly on the other sectors. 
 
2.1.1 The public sector 
  In 483 BC, i.e. shortly after its victory in Marathon in 490 BC, Athens discovered 
productive silver mines in Laureion. With the help of the funds from this source and on 
the advice of Themistocles the government embarked on a shipbuilding program to defend 
the city from Persians (Herodotus, VII, 144; Aristotle, The Athenian Constitution, XXII, 7).3  
So when the Persians defeated Leonidas in Thermopylai in 480 BC and became a real 
threat, Athens was fully prepared for the victorious naval battle in the straits of Salamis. 
Capitalizing on that victory, Athens started to plan for its defense on a more strategic ba-
sis and for this purpose it organized the so-called Delian League with headquarters first 
                                                 
3  From the same source of funds the government built the port of Piraeus with its fortified walls and the road 
that connected it to the center of the city. For an analysis of the institution of trierarchy on the military 
strength of Athens, see Kyriazis and Zouboulakis (2004). 
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on the island of Delos and later on in Athens. Around 467 BC the league comprised 200 
city-states that contributed ships and/or money for their common defense. Some writers 
have argued that the Athenian governments of the period took advantage of the tributes 
paid by the participating city-states and that the wealth and the glory of Athens would not have 
been possible without these funds. But as French (1964, 92-3, 96-7) has shown, Athens absorbed 
tremendous costs in leading this alliance and, in addition, when the funds of the Delian League 
were merged around 440 BC (Blamire, 2001, 99), she had already attained a high rate of growth 
in terms of living standards and population (French, 1964, 136-7). Thus, in our view, the city had 
become rich through manufacturing, shipping and other export-import activities well before the 
alliance was established, as well as because to a great extent the citizens themselves covered the 
cost of their armory during military expeditions.4   
In any case, in addition to the tributes from its allies and the income from the Laureion 
mines, the Athenian government received revenues and contributions from several other sources. 
In particular, at one time or another, during the period under consideration, additional revenues 
and contributions came from: a) income taxes paid by rich citizens;5 b) duties, such as the one on 
metics called Metoikion;6 in times of war metics were also required to pay a special income tax 
and it is mentioned (Isocrates, Trapeziticus, 41) that they regarded it as a honorable obligation to 
share in the cost of the city’s wars; c) rents from public lands; d) court fees, fines and confisca-
tions of property after due process; e) spoils acquired from victories in wars ); f) donations, and g) 
provisions  by citizens and metics, according to their wealth, of public services called Liturgies, 
like the construction and maintenance of warships, the writing and the performance of theatrical 
plays, financing of festivals, etc. (Thucydides, VII, 91). 
Turning to public expenditures (see Aristotle, The Athenian Constitution, L-L.1, 
Salmon, 1999, 156-7), the Athenian state: a) financed partly the cost of arm services; b) 
built infrastructure and monuments that decorated the city; c) compensated officials who 
were chosen by lottery to serve in the assembly, the council and the courts; d) paid for the 
services of public officers who worked as agoranomoi and metronomoi, monitoring respec-
                                                 
4  Andreades (1933, 389-92; Amemiya, 2006, Part II, 130) estimates that in the period 454-433 BC the total 
amount of tributes received by Athens from its allies amounted approximately to 370 Talents per annum.  
5  In Athens, citizens who had annual income corresponding to the value of 500, 300, and 200 Medimnoi paid 
direct taxes. Contos and Baloglou (1995) estimate that total revenues from this tax amounted to 3600 Talents 
per annum. In addition, the citizens who belonged to the above income classes had particular financial obliga-
tions when participating in the wars of the city. For example, those in the income class of 500 Medimnoi fi-
nance a trireme, whereas those with incomes less than 200 Medimnoi were exempt from direct taxes but when 
enlisted they did menial and auxiliary tasks such as rowing in a trireme.  For an extended analysis see Ostwald 
(1995).  
6  According to the computations presented by Amemiya (2006, part II, 136), the annual revenues from this source 
amounted to 75 Talents. 
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tively the quality and the weight of goods sold in the market, dokimastai, assessing the pu-
rity of coins, sitophylakes, inspecting the quality and fair price of products from grain and barley, 
and emporiou epimelitai, supervising the import and export trade at the port of Piraeus; e) granted 
pensions to disabled who could not earn enough income to live on their own; f) maintained and 
educated up to the age of 18 all orphans from parents killed in wars, etc.  
 From the above it follows that essentially the state in Athens performed all the tasks that 
are carried out by contemporary governments. It contributed to the maintenance of military forces. 
It constructed infrastructure. It provided the necessary bureaucracy for the functioning of the gov-
ernment and the courts. It supervised the markets, but without controlling administratively the 
prices of goods and services, and even provided welfare support for the citizens in need. 
 
2.1.2 The private sector 
 The Athenians, despite some philosophical arguments against vulgar works and employ-
ments, mostly advanced after the Peloponnesian War, did not turn against labor as a source of 
wealth. Moreover, many citizens, particularly from the poor and middle classes, did work for others 
and were also involved in farming, trade and other business activities. That they did so we know 
from Demosthenes (Against Eubulides, 35) who says “…do not scorn the needy (their poverty is 
misfortune enough), and scorn still less, those who choose to engage in trade and get their liv-
ing by honest means.” So, given that all elected in state functions served only for a limited 
time,7 it seems reasonable to surmise that the majority of male adults citizens during peace 
times practiced income earning activities of some form or another. Their range and nature are 
described briefly below.  
 
2.1.2.1 Production  
The production sector of the Athenian economy in the 5th century BC consisted of 
mining, agriculture, including animal husbandry, and manufacturing. Dominant among the 
three was agriculture. But mining and manufacturing expanded rapidly and contributed sig-
nificantly to the wealth of Athens.  Their stylized features were the following. 
 
Mining 
When the new heading of silver was discovered in the mines of Laureion and its op-
eration started in 483 BC, Herodotus (VII, 144) informs us that the revenues of Athens in-
                                                 
7 Aristotle (Politics, 1317b, 20-5), while presenting the fundamental bases of democracy (having in mind the 
Athenian democracy), stressed how important it was that “no office be held twice, or more than a few times, 
by the same person”. 
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creased significantly. Unfortunately, the historical sources do not give us details about how 
the mines were leased, what was the role of the city, or how silver was extracted from the ore. 
But from the comment by Aeschylus (Persians, 240), the testimonies by Herodotus (Ibid.) 
and Thucydides (VII, 91), and a joke by Aristophanes (Knights, 362) we can conclude with 
relative certainty that the mines were an exceptional source of wealth for both the city and the in-
dividuals. Andreades (1933, 339) estimates that around 450 BC state revenues from the Laureion 
mines amounted to 50-100 Talents. However, according to the evidence cited by Amemiya (2006, 
part II, 137-8), in addition to the leases, the miners had to pay 10% tax on their total output of sil-
ver, the value of which amounted to about 1000 Talents. Hence, the estimation by other authors 
that state revenues from mines amounted to 160 Talents is quite reasonable.  
       As to the scale of mining operations we have only the information that, when 
Spartans occupied Decelea in 413 BC, there escaped 20.000 slaves who worked mostly in the 
mines. After this event, the treasury of the city lost its main source of revenue and it was 
forced to utilize the gold from the statues of Parthenon to finance the war effort during the 
rest of the Peloponnesian War until the defeat of Athens in 404 BC. 
 
Agriculture 
The arable land of Attica was devoted predominantly to the production of wheat and 
barley. The productivity of land used for wheat was roughly half of that cultivated with bar-
ley, and this explains perhaps why wheat was produced only in as little as one fourth of the 
cultivated areas. But the consensus is that Athens experienced permanently significant deficits 
in the production of grains, which had to be covered with imports (Isager and Hansen, 1975, 
20-9; Amemiya, 2006, part II, 104-5). Perhaps this explains why Athenians attached the im-
portance in agriculture emphasized by Xenophon from whom we learn that: “It has been no-
bly said that husbandry is the mother and nurse of the other arts. For when husbandry flour-
ishes, all the other arts are in good fettle; but whenever the land is compelled to lie waste, the 
other arts of landsmen and mariners alike well-nigh perish” (Xenophon, Oeconomicus, v.17). 
Husbandly, on the other hand, flourished by raising goats, sheep, oxen, horses, swine 
and other animals. Xenophon mentions the importance of this activity in at least two occa-
sions. The first is in his (Memorabilia, IV.3.10) where Socrates says: “For what creature reaps 
so many benefits as man from goats and sheep and horses and oxen and asses and the other 
animals.  He owes more to them, in my opinion, than to the fruits of the earth. At least they 
are not less valuable to him for food and commerce,” whereas the second instance is in his 
(Oeconomicus, VII.20, XX.23) where he emphasizes the combination of husbandry with 
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farming.  From data scattered here and there we know that the production of milk and wool 
was the prime goal of the owners of flocks of sheep and goats and that the demand of Atheni-
ans was more or less met by local producers, even though sheep, goats, swine and cattle were 
also brought to the market from neighboring areas (Amemiya, 2006, part II, 113).  
        Agriculture was organized mostly in small lots owned by citizens. Metics were not allowed 
to own land but they could rent farms and cultivate them for their own account.8 Cultivation was 
performed as a family activity but there were also large farms using good numbers of slaves.  
 
Manufacturing 
It has been established that many citizens and metics in Athens pursued manufac-
turing activities and became quite wealthy. According to Xenophon, by: 
“…manufacturing one of these commodities, namely groats, Nausicydes, keeps not only 
himself and his family, but large herds of swine and cattle as well, and has so much to 
spare that he often undertakes costly public duties; that Cyrebus feeds his whole family 
well and lives in luxury by baking bread, Demeas of Collytus by making capes, Menon by 
making cloaks; and most of the Megarians make a good living out of smocks” (Memora-
bilia, II.VII.6). Or, for another piece of evidence regarding the growth of manufacturing 
during the period under consideration, manufacturers of just about everything one can 
think of are represented in the a list of 170 occupations cited by Harris (2002, 88-99). 
Hence, all indications are that manufacturing aimed not only for covering local consump-
tion but generating exports as well (Isager and Hansen, 1975, 38-42).  
Particularly active in this sector were manufacturers from the class of metics. Metics 
were admitted in Athens by the time of Solon (Plutarch, Solon, 22, 24; Stanley, 1999, 228) 
because of their special knowledge in certain important industrial activities such as armory, 
shipbuilding, pottery, ornaments, etc. The majority of metics were entrepreneurs or trained 
metal workers and potters (Isager and Hansen, 1975, 70-3). Aside from farming, their entre-
preneurial activities were concentrated in small-scale industrial enterprises. An example is 
that of Kephalus, who was the father of orator Lysias. Kephalus had been invited by Pericles 
from Syracuse in order to bring to the city his special knowledge and experience in shield 
production as well as his capital (Lysias, Against Eratosthenes, 4). Similarly, the orator 
Lysias and his brother owned a shield production enterprise. So, even though they were 
metics, through their profits they were able to undertake special expensive Liturgies (Lysias, 
Against Eratosthenes, 8, 19). Also, the well-known and rich banker, the metic Pasion and his 
                                                 
8 An example in this regard is that of freedman Alkias (Lysias, To fig tree apologia, 10). 
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freedman Phormion, directed a shield production enterprise (Demosthenes, To Phormio, 4-5).  
In conclusion, the city of Athens became the center of expanding manufacturing activities, 
which aimed at covering local consumption as well as generate exports.  
 
2.1.2.2 Distribution: Agora 
In Athens the supply of and demand for goods and services met in a marketplace 
called agora.  Harris (2002, 75) notes that “the market in Athens was so large that it was di-
vided into several different sections. Parts of the agora were named after the goods sold there. 
Prices cleared the market”.9 In cases of excess demand or inadequate supply, the rate of prices 
increased and equilibrium was thus restored (Xenophon, Ways and Means, iv.36). Moreover, 
in addition to prices, the number of firms in the market reached equilibrium. When the rate of 
supply increased, while demand remained at the same level, the rate of prices and profits de-
creased and thus the factors of production moved to another more profitable employment. As 
Xenophon claimed: “An increase in the number of coppersmiths, for example, produces a fall 
in the price of cooper work, and the coppersmiths retire from business. The same thing hap-
pens in the iron trade. Again, when corn and wine are abundant, the crops are cheap, and the 
profit derived from growing them disappears, so that many give up farming and set up as 
merchants or shopkeepers or money lenders” (Ibid, iv.6). 
From the above we may infer that the market in Athens operated quite efficiently. But 
the price mechanism was aided also by other means. For example, from Xenophon we learn 
that in the markets for goods buyers and sellers were coming closer and, through the function 
of the retail merchants (Cyropaedia, IV.V.42), the cost of transactions decreased significantly. 
As he put it: “the city as a whole has ten thousand times as much of everything as we have; 
and yet you may order any sort of servant to buy something in the market and to bring it 
home, and he will be at no loss: every one of them is bound to know where he should go to 
get each article. Now the only reason for this is that everything is kept in a fixed place” 
(Oeconomicus, VIII.22). Moreover, there were no price controls, with the exception of grain 
and grain products, buyers and sellers came into frequent personal contact, and the city with 
its various officers monitored closely the quality and the weight of the goods sold. As a result, 
the circumstances for sellers to practice opportunism were extremely limited and this en-
hanced further the efficiency of the market. 
                                                 
9  Harris (2002, 76) gives many examples of how the prices fluctuated with supply and demand.  
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Even though the information we have refers mostly to the market in Athens, it is fairly 
certain that comparable retail markets operated in the port of Piraeus and other decentralized 
locations. Support for this conjecture is derived from the finding by Isager and Hansen (1975, 
51) to the effect that “at least half the population of Attica were engaged in trade.”  For, if this is 
the case, the agora in Athens could not have been an isolated phenomenon, since the population 
in Attica lived in widely dispersed villages and many would not be able to travel frequently to 
the Athenian market to buy their provisions. Moreover, from the same source we get a glimpse 
why so many people were involved in trading.  
They did so because they were motivated by profit. Demosthenes (Against Eubulides, 31) 
mentions that in order for metics to participate in the agora they ought to have paid the tax me-
toikion, whereas foreigners could trade if they paid the tax xenika. Why would anyone in his right 
mind pay these taxes just to take part in the market? The answer has to be that they expected to 
cover the tax and in addition to be compensated by getting the best deals possible for their efforts. 
That this behavior had to do with the pursuit of profit was described eloquently by Xenophon who 
stated: “In other states [except Sparta], I suppose, all men make as much money as they can. One 
is a farmer, another a shipowner, another a merchant, and others live by different handicrafts” 
(Constitution of the Lacedaemonians, VII.1; brackets added). Therefore, given that the markets in 
Attica worked as an exchange mechanism and those that participated behaved so as to get the best 
value for their money, we are inclined to surmise that Athens had a proto-capitalistic “market 
economy” which functioned much like the contemporary market economies.  
In short, the distribution of goods and services in Athens took place in a voluntary ex-
change environment where the economic calculations of people were based on market deter-
mined prices and their plans on the consumption and on the production side, were driven so as 
to get the best value for their efforts. From the available evidence it seems that markets 
worked efficiently and thus contributed significantly to the economy.  
 
2.1.2.3 Money and banking 
Silver is a metal with particular advantages as a medium of exchange and store of 
value. It does not corrode. It is relatively light. By comparison to iron or copper, a small quan-
tity of silver holds considerable exchange value; and, last but not least, while its supply was 
generally scarce, the mines in Laureion produced it in plentiful quantities.10 So given that sil-
ver money had been already established in the Hellenic classical world by Aegina, Corinth 
                                                 
10 All these specific qualities of silver in the function of money were adequately discussed by Aristotle (Nico-
machean Ethics, 1133). 
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and others states, Athens gained a significant comparative advantage. By having her own cur-
rency, the Attic Drachma, she was able to enjoy all the benefits of coinage, particularly when 
she became the leading city-state of the Delian League against Persians.  
With respect to banking, the plentiful evidence that exists shows that it functioned much 
like to day. It was pursued on a profit-making basis (Demosthenes, Against Stephanus, 23). Like 
modern banking, it was involved in the changing of currencies of various city-states. It accepted 
deposits (Isocrates, Trapeziticus, 2, 37). It offered loans with interest (Lycurgus, Against 
Leocrates, 23) both unsecured and after contracts were signed (Lysias, On The Property of Era-
ton: Against the Treasury, 3). It advanced bottomry loans to grain importers in which the ship 
and/or the cargo were given as security (Demosthenes, The Plea of Chrysippus and his Partner 
against Phormio in the matter of a loan, 6-7). 
Moreover, in some cases, when rich Athenians and metics stopped their productive and 
trade activities, they became rentiers by offering capital to potential entrepreneurs as well as for 
the operation of businesses (Karayiannis, 1992, 74-6). Not only free citizens but also some 
metics started profitable enterprises by borrowing capital from rich rentiers and/or bankers. An-
cient Athenians were not opposed to intermediation in the demand and supply of interest paying 
loans for investment. Specifically, the orators Isocrates (Areopagiticus, 31-35) and Demosthe-
nes (Against Aphobus I, 61) emphasized that such kinds of loans to potential entrepreneurs were 
of prime importance for the economic development of the city. Thus, the supply of loanable 
funds was considered to be a very fruitful economic activity  (Aristotle, Politics, 1320b, 1-15) 
as was also the assumption of various risks, mainly in wholesale trade (Demosthenes, To Pan-
taineton, 54; To Zenotheme, 2; To Phormio,  6-7; To Lacritus,  22, 25). 
 Finally, just to lay the denials to rest, it suffices to note that Athenian bankers had 
adopted forms of checking accounts and extended even sale credits. That this form of lending 
did exist is corroborated by the fact that Plato (Laws, 915 E) in his scheduled ideal city pro-
hibits credit sales by considering them as illegal. 
 
2.1.3 The export-import sector 
 As was mentioned above, Athens experienced permanent deficits in grain production. By 
itself these deficits necessitated the importation of large quantities of grain.  To secure these im-
ports on a sustained basis, Athens required to have: a) money to pay for them; b) port and ware-
housing facilities to store and preserve the imported grain; c) banking facilities to extend loans to 
grain importers and dealers; d) some insurance technology to spread the risks of cargos, which 
were transported mainly over the sea; e) some sort of mechanism to resolve conflicts that are cus-
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tomary in trading, particularly over long distances, and f) the naval power to keep safe the sea 
routes to the grain producing states. From the available evidence we know that during the 5th cen-
tury Athens adopted policies by means of which it secured all these prerequisites. 
Present in Athens and Piraeus were also offices of Proxenoi, who looked after the 
needs of foreign merchants, much like modern consulates, (Burke, 1992, 205). Trade disputes 
were resolved through an efficient legal system; and, last but not least, the Athenian money in 
the form of silver coins was accepted throughout the Greek world and the mines of Laureion 
produced enough silver and the manufacturing sector produced enough surpluses of goods to 
pay for grain and other imports. Moreover, by building a strong naval fleet, Athens managed 
to keep relatively safe the sea routes leading to Hellespont Straits and through them to the 
grain producing countries of Black Sea.  
As in the case of manufacturing, export-import activity was a dominating enterprise 
for Athens. Not only citizens but also metics established and directed wholesale enterprises in 
importing grain and exporting Athenian products. They were considered as offering a special 
and valuable service to the city of Athens (Lysias, Against Andokides, 49). In particular, an-
cient Athenians recognized that the importers of grain by assuming various risks deserved 
special profit and their riches were justified (Isocrates, To Demonicus, 19). Aristophanes in 
his comedy Ploutos (900) notices that grain importers in times of war were released from 
taxes as they offered a valuable service to the city. Similarly, Xenophon (Ways and Means, 
III, 4) proposed to the city to pay special tribute to grain importers (e.g. to give them the front 
positions in gymnastic games and theatrical performances).  
 
2.2 The economy of Sparta 
The 5th century was also the period during which Sparta reached its apogee of power. 
But in contrast to Athens, which had been organized socially and militarily so as to maximize 
the individual liberties and the material welfare of its citizens by adopting the ideal type 
model of a market economy, Sparta sought military power for its own sake by subjecting its 
citizens to a regime of bare biological subsistence in conjunction with complete subjugation 
of their liberties to the tenets of the state. Following Finley (1981, 25), and given that Sparta 
did not have a foreign trade sector, a reasonable representation of its economy would allow 
for three sectors. That is: a) the public sector, including the military, b) the sector of produc-
tion and distribution of goods and services, and c) the system of agoge (αγωγή) for raising 
young Spartans and molding their character to suit the objectives of the state throughout life. 
As we did above in the case of Athens, in this section we shall focus on the first two sectors 
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and leave the third for later.      
 
2.2.1 The public sector 
Sparta had neither silver mines nor a developed tax system. Thus unlike Athens its 
public treasury lacked two most important sources of revenues. On the other hand, from nu-
merous sources we know that Sparta had distributed the lands in the old city and the surround-
ing areas to citizens and Perioikoi, respectively. So the view of Thucydides (Ι, 70-1) that 
Sparta experienced great difficulty in financing its wars during the 5th century is fully cor-
roborated. But then, how did Sparta manage to establish its hegemony and become during the 
period 490-404 BC the other most powerful city of Greece?  
In retrospect, it is all the more amazing that Sparta managed this achievement drawing 
essentially on a system of taxation in which its citizens paid public expenditures for the most 
part directly.  This system worked as follows. To retain citizenship every male Spartan citizen 
had to participate in the gatherings called Syssitia. Aside from acting as forums of public de-
bate, conferring honors, molding the character of younger citizens, etc., the Syssitia served 
austere, i.e. Spartan, meals that covered the basic food needs of those who participated.11 But in or-
der to take part in the Syssitia, every citizen had to contribute on a monthly basis “one Medimnoi of 
wheat, eight Choes of wine, five Mnes cheese, five semi-mnes figs and a little money for the pur-
chase of breakfast” (Plutarch, Lycurgus, 12). These contributions came from the produce of land 
lots and public slaves that the city had allocated to citizens. Hence, ultimately this part of public ex-
penditures was passed on mainly to Helots and to a lesser degree to Perioikoi.  
Those citizens who did not manage well their land lots, or had lost ownership for other rea-
sons, and could not pay their contributions to Syssitia were demoted to the category of “Hepo-
moionoi”. On the one hand, this meant that they lost their political rights and could not be counted 
upon to provide military services, whereas on the other, it implied that, as the land was concentrated 
over time in the hands of a few families, the class of citizens shrunk and that of “Hepomoionoi” in-
creased. As a result, to pursue its wars the city was forced eventually to draft into the army from the 
class of Helots.  But unlike citizens who paid themselves for their arms while serving in the army, 
Helots had to be armed at the expense of the city. These expenses were covered not from permanent 
sources of revenues, but from one off charges, which were extremely difficult to collect, given that 
the citizens who were ready to spill their blood for victory in the city’s wars, were negative to taxa-
tion and when forced they tried to pay as little as possible. In Aristotle’s words: “The public fi-
                                                 
11  Hodkinson (2000, ch. 6) provides evidence showing that the contributions to Syssitia were excessive relative 
to food they offered to the participating citizens. 
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nance of Sparta was also badly regulated: when compelled to carry on wars on a large scale 
she has nothing in the state treasury, and the Spartans pay war taxes badly because, as most of 
the land is owned by them, they do not scrutinize each other's contributions. And the lawgiver 
has achieved the opposite result - what is advantageous-he has made the state poor and the 
individual citizen covetous” (Politics, 1271b, 10-20). 
In conclusion, public revenues and expenditures in Sparta were kept to an absolute 
minimum through three arrangements. First, by requiring all those who served in the army to 
pay for their arms, with the exception of Helots; second, by compelling all citizens to partici-
pate in Syssitia at their own expense; third, by using an all volunteer public service made from 
citizens. Unfortunately we do not have evidence regarding the expenditures for public ad-
ministration, infrastructure, welfare subsidies to the poor, etc.  
 
2.2.2 The sector of production and distribution  
At some point in time before the 6th century BC, about which we do not have pre-
cise information, the land in the city of Sparta was distributed among its citizens, called 
Homoioi (Όμοιοι), in lots capable of producing foodstuffs valued at a specific value of 
Medimnoi. Even though nothing is known about the mechanism by which the equality of 
income from the various lots was established, this particular distribution aimed at enabling 
citizens to meet their basic material needs equally (Aristotle, Politics, 1294b, 25-35, Plu-
tarch, Lycurgus, 8-10, Mossé, 1992, 132-133).12 Selling and buying of land was forbidden. 
But at the end of Peloponnesian War a law adopted that gave citizens the right to donate 
or bequeath their lots. In turn, this started a process through which land ownership came 
under the control of few families and the aims of the original distribution were vitiated 
(Plutarch, Ages, 5; Aristotle, Politics, 1270a, 15-35, 1307a, 40; Mossé, 1992, 135; Os-
borne, 1996, 481-182; Hodkinson, 2000, ch. 3). Thus during the 5th century we can as-
sume safely that Spartans were not allowed to engage in land transactions as a means to 
accumulate wealth or cover their material needs.  
 
2.2.2.1 Production 
With the usage of land thus restricted, the only possible avenues left for citizens to 
earn an income was either to cultivate their lots themselves or to rent them to the distinct 
                                                 
12 At some later time when Messinea was conquered by Sparta the historical sources indicate that a second dis-
tribution of land took place, which favored mainly the class of Perioikoi.  However, which particular areas 
were involved, how the land was divided, and what conditions applied to its use are issues which are clouded 
in much uncertainty. 
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category of non-citizens called Perioikoi (Περίοικοι). But the citizens of Sparta were not al-
lowed to learn or to practice income earning crafts and professions (Aristotle, Politics, 1271b, 
5-10). Nor were they permitted to get involved in any business activity or Chrematismos (Xeno-
phon, Hellenica, III, 1, 28), because their sole role was to prepare for war as well as to carry out 
the political and social affairs of the city (Plutarch, Lycurgus, 8-10).  
 
Agriculture 
As a result of these restrictions the production of agricultural products was conducted 
partly under the supervision of Spartan women with the assistance of Helots, who were allo-
cated to them by the state (Alcock, 2002), and partly by Perioikoi, who either cultivated their 
own lots or rented them from citizens, including agricultural implements and Helots, culti-
vated them for their own account and shared with the owners of the lots the crops produced 
(sharecropping). However as with the passage of time land ownership came under the control 
of a few families, the class of Perioikoi dominated this sector.  
The type of agricultural production that prevailed was mainly one of autarky. In other 
words, cultivation aimed at securing the necessary quantities of produce to cover the con-
sumption of Spartan families themselves, including of course the consumption of Helots, and 
leave enough surpluses to undertake the contributions to Syssitia. But while this regime repre-
sented the rule, Hodkinson (2000, ch. 4) reports that cultivation aimed at surpluses to ex-
change for other products was not uncommon; because the elite and the rich landowners who 
employed the system of sharecropping produced quantities of agricultural products that were 
too large for their self-consumption. In this light, and given that it would be farfetched to as-
sume that those obligated for contributions to Syssitia had the right quantities throughout the 
year, a rather safe conclusion is that there was large scope for exchanges of agricultural and 
animal products, if not in a market like environment, at least in a person to person and family 
to family barter setup.  
Moreover, the historical sources suggest that animal husbandry in Sparta may have been 
more developed than in Athens, particularly because of the more suitable soil and climatic con-
ditions. Characteristic of the qualitative differences that may have existed is the following pas-
sage: “Not even one of their farms could be compared with ours [i.e. Of Sparta] in scale and 
quality, nor in the ownership of slaves, particularly in the obedience of Helots, nor in the horses 
and other animals that graze in Messinea” (pseudo-Plato, Alcibiades, 122D; brackets added). 
To be more precise, husbandry in Sparta was a practical necessity since every male citizen 
had to deliver each month five Mnai of cheese to Syssitia. But apart from this obligation hus-
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bandry made good economic sense both for rich and poor Spartans because of the exception-
ally suitable environmental conditions as well as for its complementarity with agriculture. 
 
Handicraft 
Aside from agriculture and husbandry the production sector of Spartan economy must 
have comprised also various sorts of handicraft activities ranging from the construction of 
farm implements to the making of weaponry and clothing for the soldiers of the army and the 
population more generally. Moreover, drawing on Hodkinson (2000, ch. 5) it is rather safe to 
infer that Spartan households owned and used in everyday life various utensils, furniture and other 
more or less precious ornaments and decorations. For example, Plutarch in his Lycurgus (9), where 
he stresses the fabrication of various practical objects, refers to an author of the classical period 
named Kritias whom he quotes in relation to the Spartan cup, called Kothon. Hence there must have 
existed some handicraft making various objects beyond the narrow range of those that were abso-
lutely necessary according to the austere way of life of Spartans. But we have no information either 
about its importance relative to agriculture or about its structure.  
 
2.2.2.2 Distribution: Barter trade 
In Sparta the production of agricultural and husbandry products aimed primarily at 
self-consumption. But the need to have the right quantities of goods for the contributions to 
Syssitia every month implies that some exchanges took place. To the same conclusion leads 
the evidence that there were large farms that produced surpluses for exchange. In addition, 
craftsmen who made various useful items for everyday life aimed at exchanging them for 
food and other products. Hence the issue in question is not whether there were exchanges of 
goods but how they were carried out. From the available historical evidence it is safe to con-
clude that exchanges in Sparta took place by exchanging goods directly for goods without the 
intermediation of some form of money.  Irrespective of whether these exchanges took place in 
isolated person to person and family to family contacts or in a dedicated place where all with 
surpluses came to exchange them for the goods they wished to have, the nature of exchange 
was barter. This inference is corroborated further by the fact that the monetary sector of the 
economy was parochial. A kind of money from iron had been adopted which lacked the nec-
essary ease of use because it was heavy. This money was used exclusively as a measure of 
value of exchange in domestic transactions (Xenophon, Constitution of the Lacedaemonians, 
VII, 5; Plutarch, Lycurgus, 8-10), whereas money of other city-states performed the roles of 
money as a medium of exchange and store of value.  
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Moreover, in the absence of export-import activities, with the exception perhaps of 
some limited exchanges of goods with neighboring city-states, the economy in Sparta oper-
ated in a closed economy framework, thus limiting its capability to absorb new knowledge 
and technical know-how from abroad.   
 
2.3 A comparative assessment of the two economies.  
The Athenian economy in the 5th century BC functioned much like a modern market 
economy. Its dominant sector was agriculture and animal husbandry. But mining, manufacturing 
banking services and export-import activities were also present and contributed significantly to 
the wealth and economic growth (French, 1964, 156, 166-7). The distribution system comprised 
retail and wholesale markets. Economic agents acted upon prices determined from the mechanism 
of demand and supply and aimed at getting the best value for their efforts. Exchanges were facili-
tated by silver base money and the financial intermediation of banks. The state supervised the 
good operation of markets through specially assigned officers and mostly without imposing price 
controls. Trade disputes were resolved through an efficient legal system and arbitration. The tax 
system entailed direct and indirect taxation as well as the obligation to undertake liturgies accord-
ing to one’s wealth. And last but not least, the state introduced all the institutions that were neces-
sary in order to maintain law and order and cultivate the trust among economic agents.  
By contrast, during the same period, the economy of Sparta operated in a closed 
economy context with its main focus on self-sufficiency in agricultural and husbandry 
products. Its distribution mechanism was based on barter and its money from iron was 
used solely as a measure of value. Moreover, by implication of these features and the tes-
timony we have from Isocrates (Bousiris, 18-20) and Xenophon (Hellenica, C, I, 28), we 
can infer that the citizens of Sparta did no look to their own work for increasing their in-
come. To whatever extent they depended on their property, they were mostly pure rentiers 
drawing incomes from the work of Perioikoi and Helots. Their productive effort was very 
low, not only because they did not have the right incentives, but also because learning and 
practicing crafts and professions was forbidden. Furthermore, given that the possessions 
of gold and silver coins as well as Chrematismos were prohibited, citizens were deliber-
ately discouraged to undertake entrepreneurial activities. Thus in order to cover their ma-
terial needs they looked to conquering other cities, to offering their military services as 
mercenaries, and to receiving the welfare contributions by the state, which guaranteed 
their economic survival for life. Therefore, it is not an exaggeration to say that this econ-
omy operated under a set of legal arrangements that stifled the efforts of citizens for mate-
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rial improvement and suppressed all human inclinations for economic progress.  
In light of the above fundamental differences between the two ancient economies, the 
question that arises is which of them performed best in economic terms. In the 5th century 
Sparta had roughly the same size of population with Athens. But the size of land, the fertility 
of soils and the climate in Laconia and Messinea were far more favorable for agriculture to 
those in Attica. Hence, with all other conditions the same, the geography hypothesis would 
lead us to expect that Sparta would grow wealthier than Athens. However, judging from the 
ancient monuments that we still see all over Athens, the extensive defensive and civilian in-
frastructure that was built, as well as the life style of Athenians during the period under con-
sideration, all indications are that Athens grew vastly wealthier than Sparta.13 So the geogra-
phy hypothesis most certainly was not validated. The reasons why it failed have to do with the 
differences in the organization and the associated institutions that each city-state adopted to 
confront the main challenges that it faced. To these differences we turn immediately below.  
 
3. A theory of endogenous moral norms and institutions  
In our view, city-states evolved through the unification of villages because they held 
the prospect of responding successfully to at least two main challenges-objectives. The first of 
them was to provide more effective defense against attacks from other city-states and the sec-
ond was to confront in a better way the economic problem, given the available technology and 
resources. As they faced different geographic conditions, Athens and Sparta took different 
approaches to meeting these objectives. Athens placed most of the emphasis on attaining the 
economic objective, whereas Sparta focused on the defensive capabilities of the state. As a 
result, they adopted different institutions and different systems of morality to secure their effi-
cient operation. Our aim in this section is threefold. First, to describe the main institutions that 
each city-state put in place; second, to explain the systems of morality that were associated 
with them, and thirdly to highlight the systems of agoge, not simply education, through which 
each city-state molded into the character of its citizens the tenets of morality that were re-
quired for the efficient operation of its institutions.  
 
3.1 The institutions  
A theory why only Athens became the economic power in classical antiquity has its 
origin in the factor of production in which it was greatly disadvantaged, i.e. the size and fertil-
                                                 
13 During 480-425 the Athenians built much more buildings than Corinth and of course Sparta (Salmon, 1999, 
149). 
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ity of land in Attica. As the latter could not produce enough grain to feed the population, the 
city-state of Athens was obliged to adopt an organization, which on the one hand would pro-
vide incentives to farmers to increase the productivity of their farms, and on the other to facili-
tate the necessary imports from grain producing areas of the Aegean and beyond. On the contrary, 
Sparta by being rich in grain producing arable and irrigable lands had the luxury to adopt an or-
ganization that generated incentives to achieve military supremacy. So the differences in the struc-
ture and the performance of the two economies were driven mainly by the differences in the or-
ganization they adopted. In the case of Athens the political and economic institutions were opti-
mally selected to alleviate the scarcity in grain, whereas the corresponding arrangements in Sparta 
were designed to secure the military power of the city-state perhaps for defense purposes, but 
more likely for the benefit of its ruling oligarchy.  . 
Seen through the lenses of this analysis, all historical developments appear to fall 
naturally in place. Since the fundamental question in Athens was how to secure the necessary 
quantities of grain, simple economic reasoning suggested the adoption of the following insti-
tutions. Private property rights, so that farmers had all the incentives to work and invest in 
their farms to increase productivity; Direct democracy to guarantee that property rights would 
not be expropriated under any circumstances;14 A taxation system that imposed moderate 
taxes and was democratically approved;15 Courts to uphold the laws of the city-state and 
punish transgressions.16 Market driven production and distribution of goods and services 
to make sure that enough surpluses of mining and manufacturing goods were produced to 
exchange for the required imports of grain; and last but not least, a strong naval fleet to 
keep open and safe the routes to grain producing areas.  
By contrast, given that, after annexing Messinea, Sparta was self-sufficient in 
                                                 
14The institution that best characterized Athenian economy was private property (Morris, 2004, 734). Through 
its adoption the middle economic class of citizens grew significantly and this development helped the estab-
lishment of democracy (Aristotle, Politics, 1295b, 30-40; see also Baeck, 1994, 44) . The majority of writers 
in Athens supported private property on several grounds. For example, they argued that private property in-
creases the level of care, responsibility and work effort of the individual (Xenophon, Oeconomicus, ix.17, 
Symposium, viii, 15) and also that it enhances social cohesiveness (Harmony) (Demosthenes, Philippics, IV, 
45; Aristotle, Politics, 1261b, 5-15). In more recent years, private property rights and democracy have been 
identified theoretically (see e.g. Leblang, 1996) and empirically (see e.g. Leblang, 1997; Barro, 1999; Acemo-
glu and Johnson and Robinson, 2004) as factors of prime importance for economic growth.  
15 Taxes were partly obligatory and were reckoned according to a citizen’s income (Aristotle, The Athenian Con-
stitution, VII, 4) and partly voluntary through the undertaking of liturgies (see e.g. Demosthenes, Against Aris-
togeitonos, I, 51-2; Against Phaenippus, 32). Such a system of taxes was used not only as a source for public 
revenues, but furthermore as a mechanism for preventing the extreme misdistribution of wealth. 
16 From various sources it turns out that Athenians had recognized that the individual, acting in his own interest, 
compares benefits and costs and acts accordingly- a behavior widely corroborated by modern economic analy-
sis (Tullock and McKenzie, 1975, 122-4). For this reason, they developed a legal system to prevent unlawful 
acts that provided for stiff penalties (e.g. Lysias, Against Ergotelous, A 15, Demosthenes, Against Aristogei-
tonos, A 17), so as to increase the cost of wrongdoing (Andokides, 73, Thucydides, ΙΙΙ, 45). 
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grain, what it needed primarily was a strong military to keep Helots in Laconia and 
Messinea peaceful, to defend the city-state from external threats, and perhaps to extend its 
hegemony beyond its borders. For this purpose Sparta adopted the following institutions. 
Through a series of laws it suppressed the natural urging of human beings to amass wealth 
in the form of fixed and personal property assets. As a result citizens lost their economic 
independence and were attached for their survival to the city-state. To mold the minds of 
citizens so as to think only about their obligations to the city, it instituted the Syssitia, 
which performed many functions ranging from the provision of food and shelter, to the 
bestowing of honors for heroism in wars, and to the passing of judgment for questionable 
behavior. By forbidding the holding of gold and silver coins of other city-states and by not 
issuing its own money Sparta adopted barter in economic transactions, and finally, to in-
sulate the city-state from bad influences from abroad it closed its economy to foreign trade 
and imposed a regime of isolation and self-sufficiency (autarky) (Xenophon, Constitution of 
the Lacedeamonians, VII, 5-6; Plutarch, Lycurgus, 8-10).   
Having described the main institutions that each city-state put in place in order to ac-
complish its objectives, it is no wonder that Sparta failed to reach its economic potential abso-
lutely and relatively to Athens. In Sparta the state usurped all sovereignty from individuals 
and their families and treated them as instruments of an oligarchic state where those who were 
appointed to positions of responsibility served for life (Gerousia), whereas all the rest were 
obliged to obey their decisions without any recourse to consultation (Plutarch, Lycurgus, 6). 
On the contrary, in Athens the state chose deliberately to become or it evolved into an instru-
ment of the collective will of its citizens as the latter was effected through the democratic 
process. Consequently, the difference in their economic performance can be easily explained 
by reference to the objectives that each state was constituted to attain and, secondly, to the 
political and economic institutions that were adopted for this purpose. In short, despite advan-
tageous geographical conditions, Sparta failed to reach its economic potential because in its 
abundance of grain it was set up from the beginning as a military state, whereas in its scarcity 
for grain Athens was constituted as a direct democracy in the service of the economy.17   
 
3.2 Moral norms in Athens 
The economic system in Athens was individualist, in the sense that it recognized the sov-
ereignty of individuals and invited their contribution to the welfare of the city. But as Pope 
                                                 
17 According to Cummings and Brocklesby (1993), the sociopolitical structure of Athens was such that it enabled 
a higher rate of performance in sciences, arts and knowledge production than other city-states. 
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Benedict XIV suggested to Voltaire in the captioned passage, if individualistic impulses are 
left unchecked, they can tear society apart. For this reason in its ultimate wisdom the city-
state of Athens had enacted a framework of arrangements that prevented an individual from 
acquiring and exercising undue power on the proper functioning of various institutions. Three 
such arrangements were, for example, first, that citizens got elected to the various positions of 
responsibility by lottery and served only for a limited tenure in order to diminish the level of 
corruption;18 second, those who deviated from expected behavior became subject to public 
uproar and denigration, and third, those who failed to observe the law and were found guilty 
by courts were liable for stiff penalties. However, in as much Athenians believed in the 
strength of their institutions, they were weary of the adverse influences that unfettered indi-
vidualism might exert on their integrity. So in addition they adopted a lifelong system of 
agoge, which stressed the importance of virtue and moderation (παν μέτρον άριστον). In par-
ticular, their system of agoge had three pillars. The first was to render young citizens literate 
through learning reading and writing, mathematics, music, the sciences of the day, as well as 
to practice a craft. The second was to introduce them to the value of gymnastics for building 
strong bodies and minds (νους υγιής εν σώματι υγιές). Finally, the third pillar was to mold 
ethos (ήθος) into their character so that their behavior in the rest of their life would conform 
to the imperatives set by the integrity and the efficient operation of Athenian institutions (Is-
ocrates, Areopagiticus, 37, 40-2; Antidosis, 181-192, 251-2; Panegyricus, 77-82). The analy-
sis below addresses the third pillar of agoge, i.e. that of ethos, which started as a character 
building process in young ages and continued throughout life by other means. 
      To infuse ethos into their character, young Athenians were prodded to adopt the views 
that philosophers, tragedians, comedians and other renowned leaders expounded on the prin-
ciples of ethical conduct. According to these views ideal ethos required every citizen to love 
Athens, be proud of its accomplishments, obey in and stand up for its laws, and be ready to 
sacrifice his life for its defense against foreign aggressors. That they were committed to these 
principles we know because citizens “freely sacrificed to the city the fairest offering it was in 
their power to give (meaning their lives)” (Thucydides, II, 43,1-2, brackets added). 
 Another norm built into their value system was to defend democracy and the way of 
life in Athens by respecting the political and economic freedoms of citizens. An account of 
what exactly young Athenians were taught in this respect is given by Aristotle who analyzing 
the proper conduct in civic affairs argued as follows: “Private transactions are voluntary and 
                                                 
18 This was a really pioneering institutional arrangement since in our days it is regarded as a truly “robust statis-
tically institution” (Levy, 2002, 135). 
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involuntary. Voluntary transactions are such as selling, buying, lending with interest, giving 
security, lending without interest, deposing money, hiring; and they are said to be voluntary 
because the origin of these transactions is voluntary, i.e. people enter upon them on their own 
free will. Involuntary transactions again are either secret, as e.g. theft, adultery, poisoning, 
pandering, enticing slaves away from their masters, assassination, and false witness, or vio-
lent, as assault, imprisonment, murder, rape, mutilation, slander, and contumelious treat-
ments” (Nicomachean Ethics, 1131a, 1-5). The implication of this analysis being that, since 
the life in Athens was based on voluntary transactions, all forms of involuntary ones were un-
ethical and ought to be avoided because they violated the basic freedoms of citizens. As we 
indicated in footnote 16 the Athenian state had enacted laws according to which those who 
were found guilty of the above and many other involuntary acts paid stiff penalties. But soci-
ety is better served if the citizens themselves avoid committing them. For this reason, the sys-
tem of agoge in ancient Athens stressed the principles of justice (respect for the law) and ai-
dos (respect for others) (Lowry, 1987, p. 170). 
  According to still another ethical norm, young Athenians were asked to be industri-
ous, because labor is the source of private property and accumulation of wealth. During So-
lon’s time, work by citizens as a source of wealth was socially applauded and esteemed. 
Contrary to some “philosophical” voices against vulgar occupations, such as Plato’s (see 
Karayiannis, 1990, 24) and Aristotle’s (Politics, 1254b, 15-25, 1277a, 40-45), the majority 
of citizens and other influential persons did not distinguish between noble and menial un-
dertakings. Two examples in point are first that the Athenians were the first Greeks who 
worshiped the goddess “industrious Athena” (“Athena Ergane”) (Pausanias, Attica, 24.3), 
and the second that they regarded as a fruitful work even that of mercenaries (Thucidides. 
I, 31, IV, 52). In addition, some influential men such as the Sophists (Karayiannis, 2000, 
340) and Isocrates (Areopagiticus, 24,44) stressed that the labor of free citizens must be 
regarded a honorable activity. Pericles (Thucydides, II, 40,1), in particular, argued that the 
Athenians employ wealth “rather as an opportunity for action than as a subject of boast-
ing; and with us it is not a shame for a man to acknowledge poverty, but the greater shame 
is for him not to do his best to avoid it”.  
Moreover, Athenians were expected to apply fairness in economic exchanges. Under 
this norm they tried to reduce transaction costs, by emphasizing fair exchange behavior. Fol-
lowing the end of the Peloponnesian War (Thucydides, III, 82), Athens fell into a period of 
advanced corruption. So most of the Greek philosophers and Orators who observed with sor-
row the moral decline of the city, tried to persuade citizens to abandon sheer individualism 
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and return to their pre-War ethical standards. They suggested and propagated the following 
principles: 19 
• They considered virtue, not wealth, as the main objective in life (Calhoun, 1926, pp. 
59-62). In Plato’s words: “the right way is to put the good qualities of the soul in the 
first and most honorable rank … good qualities of body in the second, and in the third, 
goods of estate, wealth, as we call them” (Laws, 697 B). Virtue and prudence were the 
corner stones of “ethical living”. As Aristotle emphasized, “a man discharges his 
proper function when he acts in accordance with prudence and moral virtue; for while 
virtue ensures the correctness of the end which is in view, prudence ensures the cor-
rectness of the means to it” (Nicomachean Ethics, 1144a, 5-10).  
• They linked wealth to the means of its acquisition. For example, in the Platonic dia-
logues it is stated that: “For neither does wealth bring honor to its possessor if com-
bined with cowardice.... and sundered from justice and the rest of virtue” (Plato, 
Menexenus, 246 E- 247 A). Thus, “Wealth does not bring goodness, but goodness 
brings wealth and every other blessing, both to the individual and to the state” (Plato, 
Apology, 30 B). And, as Socrates admitted, “So it seems that justice or temperance or 
piety, or some other part of virtue, must attach to the acquisition (of gold and silver)” 
(Plato, Meno, 78 D-E; brackets added). 
• They scorned illegal and unfair profits and used the term aischrokerdia (profiteering) 
to describe these actions. Aristotle stated that profiteering characterizes those who are 
"trying as they do to get gain from wrong sources" (Nicomachean Ethics, 1122a, 10-
15) and that it is indicative of the low ethical status both of the individual and of the 
city. Thus, “where it is a case of unjust gain, there is no vice to which it can be re-
ferred except injustice” (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1130b, 30-35).   
• They recommended hue and cry against all who sought profits by not paying what was 
agreed to in a contract (Hyperides, Against Athenogenes, VI, 13, VII, 15), trespassing 
upon the land of others, (Aristotle, Art of Rhetoric, 1374a, 5-20), making profit out of 
                                                 
19 In principle, the hostility of Athenians toward unfair economic transactions extended beyond the ethical stands 
stressed here. They strictly recognized that unfair economic transactions raised costs in terms of legal expenses 
(Isocrates, Antidosis, 37-9). A measure to reduce this cost was through settling of disputes by arbitration (Is-
ocrates, To Kallimachus, 10, 13-6; Demosthenes, Against Meidias, 94; Against Apaturius, 16-9, 28-9). Thus, 
they were well aware that by undermining fairness in exchanges, the transaction costs would increase and the 
resources destined for more productive purposes would decrease. Recently a number of economists (see e.g. 
North, 1990, Platteau, 1994, Tanzi, 2000) have shown that the decline in general morality and the increase in 
opportunism (Williamson, 1985, 64; Nooteboom, 1998, 172) raise transaction costs, thus reducing the avail-
able resources for economic growth.  
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the weak (Ibid. 1383b, 25-30), and paying lower wages than were deserved. "When 
taking away the product of the worker's toil they (i.e. some businessmen) maintained 
they were creating resources for the city, while on the contrary in this manner they 
were laying the foundations for a lack of economic resources in the future" (Hy-
perides, Euxenippus, 37; brackets added; our translation). 
• They condemned unfair profits from monopolistic exploitation of consumers. Lysias 
criticized the collusion of retail traders who behaved as monopsonists in buying grain 
at a low price and selling it at a higher price by becoming monopolists, (Against the 
Grain-Dealers, 5, 6-8, 12, 14-5, 17, 21). 
• They approved of the various productive and trade activities of entrepreneurs 
(Demosthenes, Against Pantaenetus, 54; Against Phaenippus, 20-1; Against Diony-
sodorus, 8-10). But proper entrepreneurial activities had to comply with the principles 
of fairness in transactions and proper use of wealth. In this respect, Xenophon advised 
entrepreneurs to conduct their business according to the commonly accepted ethical 
and legal codes (Symposium, iv.42-3; Hellenica, II.iv.40; Memorabilia, I.v.3-4), to use 
their wealth mainly for the undertaking of public expenses, because liturgies play a 
significant role in shaping the image of virtue and social acceptance of the individual, 
and to be “covetous of gain in a moderate degree” (Oeconomicus, xii, 16; see also 
Karayiannis, 2003). 
From the above it follows that for ancient Athenians an end was not ethically and socially accept-
able unless the means for its achievement were also ethically and socially acceptable as well.  
 Furthermore, Athenians were expected to have a high degree of altruism, because as 
Attica “was inhabited by the same people always” (Thucydides, I, 2) all Athenian citizens had 
a common origin. The introduction of taxation by means of which wealth was indirectly redis-
tributed in favor of poorer citizens was considered a characteristic example in this respect 
(Veyne, 1976; Ober, 1989, ch. V; Ostwald, 1995). But it was not the only one. Other exam-
ples that corroborated the existence of a high degree of altruism among Athenians were the 
common practice according to which rich citizens offered loans without interest to poor 
(Xenophon, Oeconomicus, XI, 9-11; Isocrates Areopagiticus, 31-5; For Demonicus, 28; Aris-
totle, Politics, 1263a, 30-5; 1263b, 5-15) and financed voluntarily large public projects, called 
liturgies (Thucydides, VI, 31). With respect to the latter it should be noted that Athenians ap-
plauded this type of giving and bestowed special honors to those who demonstrated altruism 
by contributing to public expenditures voluntarily over and above the taxes they paid (Bitros 
 27
and Karayiannis, 2006).20  
 Finally, honor, namely the social esteem of someone, was stressed as a moral attitude 
of paramount importance. A man with honor “ is regarded as best endowed with wisdom and 
is foremost in public esteem” (Thucydides, I, 34,6). This moral norm has two functions: as a 
motive for behaving according to the prevailing ethos and as a reward. For Thucydides, the 
citizens are “moved by a high sense of honor” (Thucydides, II, 43,1). On the other hand, the 
Athenians regarded honor as a reward for someone’s contribution. As Thucydides (II, 44,4) 
mentioned: “the love of honor alone is untouched by age, and when one comes to the ineffec-
tual period of life it is not gain as some say, that gives the greatest satisfaction, but honor”. 
Individual’s honor and fame was so important for the Athenians that they had erected statues 
for modesty and fame (Pausanias, Attica, 17.1). And as Thucydides (IV, 18, V, 16,43) ex-
plained, the citizens tried very hard to inherit their good fame to their descendants. 
In conclusion, Athenians were brought up in a lifelong system of agoge, which stressed 
ethos, based on virtue and justice, not for their own sake but for their consequences to Athenians 
themselves and to the city. To be virtuous meant to be ready to sacrifice one’s life to defend the 
principles that the Athenian democracy stood for, to live ethically by giving least priority to 
wealth, to have respect for the other citizens, to be industrious, altruist and live in honor. On the 
other hand, to be just meant to uphold and stand up for the laws of the city, to avoid committing 
involuntary transactions in the Aristotelian sense, and to observe the norms of fairness in eco-
nomic transactions. From them we are led to surmise that the rule of law that prevailed in ancient 
Athens was to a high degree the outcome of the good agoge of citizens.  
 
3.3 Moral norms in Sparta 
 In Sparta children lived with their families until the seventh year of their age. So dur-
ing this period responsible for their agoge were their parents. From the eighth year this task 
passed onto the hands of the city-state. As it was true with adults and soldiers, youngsters 
were separated into classes, which were put under the command of a governor (επίτροπος).  
The members of each class ate, slept and exercised together. Their education consisted in 
learning and writing but generally their intellectual development was not a priority, because 
the emphasis of their training was to prepare them physically to withstand the hardships of 
fighting in the city’s wars.   During the period of this training young Spartans were instructed 
                                                 
20 It should be stressed that cheating on paying one’s taxes was controlled through the institution of Antidosis, 
which provided for forced exchanges of properties between the accuser and the accused in case the latter was 
found guilty of tax evasion in a court of law. 
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to obey orders, bear punishments without objections or arguments, sleep in open air, walk 
barefooted, withstand hunger, etc. In addition, they participated in numerous wrestling com-
petitions during the year, which aimed at perfecting their techniques in wrestling as well as 
raising their competitive spirit (Xenophon, Constitution of the Lacedaemonians, II). 
A good part of the agoge of young Spartans involved the finding of food. Those in train-
ing were expected to resort to all shorts of machinations to secure their food, because by doing 
so it was believed that they would become fierce fighters. So stealing of food was not only per-
mitted but it was also encouraged. In particular, the activities of stealing food were under the 
protection of Artemis, goddess of hunting, and those who distinguished themselves in these ac-
tivities were honored by inscribing their names in some of the altars (Ibid, II, 7-9; Plutarch, Ly-
curgus, 17-8). Thus it becomes quite obvious why we indicated earlier in the paper that the sys-
tems of agoge in Athens and Sparta differed fundamentally. Simply they aimed at completely 
different citizens and adopted completely different moral norms to judge their character. In Ath-
ens stealing was prohibited and punished by stiff penalties, whereas in Sparta was honored as an 
accomplishment blessed by the gods.  
Even of more questionable moral standing was the killing of Helots as part of their 
training. Sparta wished to control the number of Helots because over time their population 
increased at a dangerously fast rate. In doing so they adopted an institution, called “Krypteia”, 
which aimed on the one hand at the hardening of the character and the preparedness of young 
Spartans for war, and on the other to forestall any attempt on the part of helots to revolt (Plu-
tarch, Lycurgus, 28). More specifically, hidden at night and armed with knifes the trainees 
trapped and murdered Helots and in particular those that were most vocal in protesting for 
their treatment. Thucydides reports that in the Peloponnesian War vanished 2000 helots who 
had been liberated earlier in recognition of their bravery, “without anybody knowing how 
each of them disappeared” (Thucydides, IV, 80). It is no wander therefore that Plato criticized 
this practice by saying that “such an institution could render Spartans brave but not just”. To 
be more precise, Plato so much detested the institution of “Krypteia” that he developed a 
critical attitude not only regarding the constitution of Sparta but also Lycurgus himself (Plu-
tarch, Lycurgus, 28). 
Another fundamental difference has to do with the regime regarding work. In Sparta 
working for income earning purposes was illegal. Here is how Xenophon describes the differ-
ence with Athens in this respect in his Constitutions of the Lacedaemonians (VII, 1-3): “Nor 
does this exhaust the list of the customs established by Lycurgus at Sparta that are contrary to 
those of the other Greeks. In other states, I suppose, all men make as much money as they 
 29
can. One is a farmer, another is a ship-owner, another is a merchant, and others live by differ-
ent handicrafts. But at Sparta Lycurgus forbade freeborn citizens to have anything to do with 
business affairs. He insisted on their regarding as their own concern only those activities that 
make for civic freedom. Indeed, how should wealth be a serious object there, when he insisted 
on equal contributions to the food supply and on the same standard of living for all, and thus 
cut off the attraction of money for indulgence's sake?” From this passage it follows that, after 
their military service ended at age 30, male Spartans citizens looked forward to long carriers 
in various government posts without pay. But since they had been trained in stealing their 
food while in the army, their integrity in safeguarding the efficient operation of Spartan insti-
tutions was questionable and that is why the stories about graft and corruption abound (Xeno-
phon, Constitution of the Lacedaemonians, XIV, 2-4; Aristotle, Politics, 1270b, 10-20). 
One main result of the above beliefs and institutions was that “even those who have 
but little receive a share of all that the country yields whenever they want anything” (Xeno-
phon, Constitution of the Lacedaemonians, VI, 4). Therefore, without any motive for life im-
provement they developed a sterile economy producing and consuming only bare necessaries. 
Such an economy produced little surplus for investment and or public funds. And here is a 
paradox: although Spartans, as the rest of the Greeks, were characterized by high patriotism 
they did not confer from their property the public expenses. As their King Archidamus con-
fessed: “we are still more deficient, neither having money in the treasury of the state nor find-
ing it easy to raise money from our private resources by taxation” (Thucydides, I, 80).  
To summarize, Sparta was organized as a military city-state. Citizens did not have pri-
vate lives. They sacrificed themselves for the well being of their city-state. Hence the moral 
norms they were trained to follow, both while serving in the army and later on, were compati-
ble with the institutions that had been set up to advance the military objectives of Sparta. As 
in Athens these moral norms required them to have love and pride for their country, to sup-
port its constitution, and be ready to spill their blood for its victory in wars of the city-state 
These were sufficient to make Sparta the top military power in the period under consideration 
without much else. No justice and no aidos; No work ethic and no altruism; No fairness in 
economic transactions, because there were none, and no economic progress, because all econ-
omy related institutions had been planned centrally to attain self-sufficiency. With this com-
parison in mind, it is time now to turn to the lessons for today.  
  
4. Lessons for today 
Both Athens and Sparta achieved their goals in the 5th century BC. Athens secured with 
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success its deficit in grains and on the way it became the leading economic power, whereas 
Sparta managed to become the top military power in the Greek world. To attain their objec-
tives, both cities-states had to assume forms of organization that were most efficient in regard 
to their objectives. Given that the efficiency of an organization depends on the efficiency and 
the coordination of the systems from which it is constituted, this necessity entailed that both 
Athens and Sparta had to put in place efficient institutions, which could be coordinated opti-
mally to accomplish the objective(s) of the respective societies. Finally, since the efficiency 
of institutions depends on their design as well as the integrity of the people who are assigned 
to operate them, both city-states had to infuse moral norms to their citizens that were com-
patible with the nature of their institutions. In retrospect, we know that both confronted suc-
cessfully all these challenges, irrespective of whether on the basis of present day criteria we 
like or not the approaches they adopted. So the questions that arise are: what are the lessons 
that we can draw from their experience and why are they important enough to matter for the 
circumstances in which we live to day?  
   A first lesson that we can draw is that the nature of social institutions as well as the 
moral norms that are compatible with their efficient operation are endogenous in the sense 
that they emerge naturally once the main objective of society is recognized in response to an 
actual or conceived challenge. In Athens and Sparta it was respectively the deficits in grains 
and the threat from foreign aggressors. But any other major challenge that would take top pri-
ority in the agenda of a nation would induce reshufflings in its institutions and shifts in the 
moral norms of its citizens to accommodate its achievement. In our view this lesson is very 
important because it is high time for nations to focus their agenda and then not only allow but 
also facilitate the necessary institutions and moral norms to take roots in their societies. For if, 
for example, economic growth and material well-being is at the top of their agenda, it would 
be futile to pursue it by Sparta like organization, institutions and moral norms, which evolved 
to achieve military supremacy. 
A second lesson is that for economic growth the only suitable arrangements are those 
that were emulated by Athens and were inherited to future generations as an exemplar para-
digm. From this we derive the following main propositions: a) property rights provide the ba-
sis for individual liberties, including the freedom of choice on the part of citizens; b) direct 
democracy constitutes the only institution of political organization that is consistent with the 
maintenance of property rights and government by the people for the people; c) state institu-
tions that are operated by citizens selected on the basis of merit and only for a limited term; d) 
an exchange economy organized according to the market system to generate the necessary 
 31
signals for the efficient distribution and mobilization of economic resources; e) money, both 
as a means of exchange and store of value, and e) law and order to guarantee that no citizen or 
group of citizens may disturb other citizens form pursuing their objective in life under the 
laws. To be sure some of these propositions are of greater importance than others. For exam-
ple, no Athenian type organization could be conceived without an emphasis on property 
rights, whereas civil servants might be appointed with quasi tenure without much damage. 
However, issues relating to the optimal mix of the institutions that are associated with the 
above propositions are hard to tackle as to some extent they are path dependent in the sense 
that their solution is determined by context specific circumstances and initial conditions.  
 The third, and perhaps most important, lesson we can draw from the comparative 
evaluation of the economies of ancient Athens and Sparta is that the institutions that emerged 
in each city-state emerged simultaneously with a set of moral norms that guaranteed their ef-
ficient operation.  In Athens, for example, where property rights, individual liberties, and 
freedom of choice in all aspects of social life were the cornerstones of their institutions, the 
system of agoge induced citizens to adopt moral norms, which established an environment of 
general morality much like the one stressed by Platteau (1994, 761). In particular, an Athe-
nian who did not live ethically was considered “shameful”, i.e. a citizen without aidos, and 
became a social outcast (Isaios, To Xenenaiton-- About the lot of Aristarchos, 3, 8). That is 
why it was terribly important for an Athenian to maintain his reputation by avoiding, for ex-
ample, even an insinuation that he attempted to gain unjustly from other people’s money (Is-
ocrates, Trapeziticus, 1). However, on the contrary, stealing food in Sparta was considered 
ethical because it advanced the cause of the state.  
In sum, what we can learn from ancient Athens and Sparta is that institutions evolve to 
serve the needs of a country and with them evolves a compatible set of moral norms that 
guarantees their efficient operation. So both institutions and moral norms emerge endoge-
nously. If economic growth is the objective of a nation, then the paradigm to emulate is the 
Athenian one because it is based on institutions and compatible moral norms, which hold 
great promise. That this is the case we know from the experience of the rich western coun-
tries, all of which constitute, in some form or another, variations of this basic model.  
 
5. Conclusions 
 When we decided to embark on this research we believed that the data we had about the 
economies of ancient Athens and particularly that of Sparta might be limited. In retrospect our 
view now is that the available data are sufficient to characterize the structure and the perform-
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ance of these economies. From their comparative evaluation we were able to show that the 
economy of Athens grew vastly wealthier than that of Sparta and we attributed this difference 
to two factors. Namely, the emergence of institutions that were optimally adjusted to acceler-
ated economic growth, and the emergence of moral norms that were adopted by the citizens of 
Athens not for themselves but because of their consequences to the operating efficiency of 
their institutions.  
As long as coarse individualism was in check by the moral norms and the institutions, 
Athens progressed materially and was able to finance all the marvelous monuments of antiq-
uity as well the products of culture and civilization we adore to day. However, after the end of 
the Peloponnesian War in 404 BC, the moral fabric of the Athenian society started to be 
eroded by extreme individualism and the institutions of this glorious city became corrupt and 
inefficient. Thus we have come a full circle back from where we begun, i.e. what Pope Bene-
dict XIV stressed to Voltaire. The character and the morality of citizens are important ingredi-
ents of economic growth because they go hand in hand with the great institutions of private 
property, democracy, and free markets.  
Therefore, poor countries in search of strategies to rapid economic growth should not 
just try to emulate the institutions of economically advanced countries. At the same time, they 
should put the emphasis of their efforts to setting up agoge systems so as to infuse into their 
citizens the required compatible “ethos”. For without the latter, no matter how successfully 
they adapt the institutions of democracy and free markets, their efficiency will be compro-
mised by the lack of a consistent general morality on the part of their citizens. And since we 
know already what are the main characteristics of morality in a democracy friendly to free 
markets, a convenient point of departure is how best to design and apply agoge systems like 
the one that emerged in ancient Athens.21    
                                                 
21 The relationship of agoge and education as sources of economic growth in ancient Athens will be taken up in a 
future research endeavor. 
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